	8 January 1957
	Copy No. 13
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INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN	DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. I I DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2007 AUTH: HR 70-2 DATE 2007
	URRENT INTELLIGENCE
CENTRAL II	NTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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1. SOVIET-SATELLITE COMMUNIQUE AFFIRMS TOUGHER SOVIET POLICY TOWARD EASTERN EUROPE

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The communiqué signed by leaders of the USSR, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Bulgaria and published by Moscow on 6 January reflects the Soviet Union's intent to strengthen its control

over its Eastern European Satellites. Together with the subsequent declaration of the Hungarian government, the communiqué also indicates that Soviet policy toward Hungary will now be based on the principles which govern its relations with all of the orthodox Satellite states, leaving Poland in a unique category.

The Hungarian government statement of 6 January introduced a tough internal policy under the firm control of the "proletarian dictatorship" and a foreign policy which calls for closer economic and political allegiance to the USSR. Prospects for a coalition government, worker council industrial management and full national sovereignty have disappeared; domestic policy as a whole now does not appear to differ in principle from the policies of the other Satellite states.

The Hungarian government's pronouncement and the Communist communique followed three days of conversations in Budapest concerning Hungary but including questions dealing with the international situation and the alleged efforts of the West to renew the cold war. This high-level meeting with several Soviet Satellites is a departure from previous post-Stalin practices and is a direct slap at the announced Yugo-slav-Polish position that relations between Communist parties should be conducted on a bilateral basis. Polish circles already fear possible Soviet attempts to isolate Warsaw from its contacts with Yugoslavia.

The omission of representatives from national Communist Poland and from highly orthodox East Germany

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and Albania was not explained. Poland, however, is known to disagree both with general Soviet policy toward the Satellites and specifically with Soviet policy toward Hungary.

Malenkov's participa	ation in the meeting
reflects an improvement in his status.	
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2. SUPREME SOVIET TO MEET SOON IN MOSCOW

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The Supreme Soviet is expected to meet at the end of January or beginning of February, when it will consider the 1957 budget, according to recent statements made to Western ambassadors by Foreign Minister Shepilov and Alexander Gorkin, secretary of the Supreme Soviet's Presidium. Shepilov stated that the session would also deal with "changes" in the Sixth Five-Year


Plan (1956-60) forecast by the recent central committee plenum.

Gorkin explained the assignment of deputy premiers to the planning commission, headed by Mikhail Pervukhin, on the ground that the commission would have executive powers in allocating funds and resources as well as planning functions.

Comment

Apparently the Pervukhin committee is expected to have made the broad decisions regarding the Sixth Five-Year Plan necessary to permit drafting a 1957 budget by the end of this month. The budget itself will show any major changes being made in the Sixth Plan in housing and consumer goods, investment, and overt military spending.

The extraordinary powers granted the planning commission, together with the assignment of high-level administrators as deputies, confirm earlier indications of Pervukhin's increasing authority. He may now be the fourth or fifth ranking member in the top leadership.



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Major Samosir, a regimental commander believed loyal to Simbolon, is reported en route to Djakarta, possibly to try to arrange a meeting between Colonel Simbolon and President Sukarno. Meanwhile, fighting between Simbolon and government units now appears less likely than between Simbolon's forces and Communist groups armed by the regimental commander at Siantar.

The problem of federalism versus centralism lies at the root of the dissidence in Sumatra, and a prominent member of the Masjumi has told an American embassy official that Sumatran events indicate that a unitary state can no longer be maintained in Indonesia. He further stated that the Masjumi was working for a form of federalism "like that in the United States."

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5. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE GAINS AMONG CHINESE IN CAMBODIA

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The Communist take-over of powerful Overseas Chinese social organizations as well as Chinese schools in Cambodia has accelerated in recent weeks, the American embassy in Phnom Penh re-

ports. Elections held recently by several of these groups throughout Cambodia have resulted in Communist control, usually by landslide votes. The influence of Chinese Nationalist adherents in Cambodia has declined to a new low, although a leader of the anti-Communist groups believes that approximately 30 percent of the local Chinese students could still be denied to Communist control if appropriate textbooks were made available.

Comment

mment The Communists are exploiting Prince Sihanouk's deference toward Peiping in order to circumvent the Cambodian government's attempt to suppress political activity among the Overseas Chinese.

The "hero's welcome" accorded Chou En-lai last November gave strong impetus to the pro-Peiping drift among the approximately 250,000 Overseas Chinese in Cambodia. The increasing economic ties between Phnom Penh and Peiping are also a significant factor in the drift toward the Communists.

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5X1	6. NEW PHILIPPINE POLITICAL PARTY PLANNED BY RECTO
25X1A	Senator Claro Recto's announcement that he has completed plans for the formation of a new Philippine political party to contest the 1957 presidential elections would appear to foreshadow a general political realignment which will more clearly separate Recto's supporters from the backers of President Magsaysay.
	A new party is necessary, according to Recto, because present leaders of the ruling Nacionalista Party have "forsaken" the party's "original principles." The senator's party will probably be advertised as standing for sovereignty, independence and pride of race. It can be expected to attract support from extreme nationalist and "old-guard" forces in the Nacionalista Party, the "sugar bloc" interests opposing Magsaysay's economic policies, and such other antiadministration forces as Senator Tanada's Citizens' Party.


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to be working for a coalition between his own Nacionalista supporters and the opposition Liberal Party. He has informed the American charge in Manila that he expects a declaration of

support from the Liberals within two weeks.

President Magsaysay, meanwhile, is known



American officials estimate that Turkey will have to import nearly 1,000,000 tons of wheat on an emergency basis between July 1957 and July 1958. This amount will be in addition to the 600,000 tons already requested from the United States during the first half of 1957.

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